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to digitalization.  
 
   Jan de Vos  
 
Interpassivity and (neuro)psychologization  
 
“The theory of interpassivity has at this point presented us with an 
unanticipated benefit in terms of a solution to a fundamental 
problem of cultural theory.”1 
 
Is this not a nice thing concerning theory; that it thinks in our place, that it 
unexpectedly gives a solution when we ourselves are stuck? And in a 
further turn of the screw, as I write these comments on Robert Pfaller’s 
book Interpassivity. The Aesthetics of Delegated Enjoyment, I cannot but 
see myself caught in this dynamic of delegation and outsourcing: for, am 
I, myself not put to work by this theory? Am I not hired so to say by the 
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theory to do its work (however, arguably, with no guarantee of delivering 
the goods)? Of course, here one gets easily confused, what, exactly is 
doing the thinking? Is it active or is it passive? That is to say, thinking with 
theory, or, outsourcing one’s thinking to theory, or, becoming oneself the 
tool of theory; are these not all modalities where the line between activity 
and passivity becomes blurred? At the very least and in this respect, 
Pfaller’s theory of interpassivity, allows us to reconsider anew the 
question of being a subject of thinking and of theory. 
Let us consider, if according to Pfaller, interpassivity concerns the 
delegation of passivity instead of activity and is about letting an other (or 
some device or apparatus) enjoy for us (rather than letting others work 
for us), is theory then not precisely the device to which we outsource our 
Denklust (enjoyment in thinking)?2 That is, we let the theory enjoy the 
thinking to find solutions whilst we can remain comfortably stuck. 
Pfaller’s point that there is always a second delegation (besides the 
delegation of pleasure) might be helpful here: Pfaller contends that while 
people transfer their pleasure to a representative agent, they also 
transfer the belief in the illusion they have staged to an undefined and 
naïve other.3 Meaning, to begin with, when we outsource, for example, 
the enjoyment of reading to the photocopier, the printer or the hard disk 
(as we copy, print or save all the texts we would like to read), we 
ourselves would never confuse the act of reading with the operation of 
the device, that is, we ourselves would never believe in the illusion that 
the device has done the reading for us. Here Pfaller’s naïve observer 
reveals itself: it is only for this agent that the whole set-up (the whole 
staging involved in interpassivity) would be satisfying. As the naïve 
observer cannot read intentions, Pfaller writes, he is satisfied with just an 
appearance as if (for example, politeness).4 Pfaller speaks in the respect 
of a special sort of illusions as “not merely illusions that certain people 
have never believed in, but apparently illusions that no one has ever 
believed in.”5 Here, most interestingly, he contrasts the naïve other to the 
Freudian Super Ego: while the latter is the instance that presumes to 
know your intentions (and can punish you for merely having them), the 
first can only judge from appearances. Does this then not mean that the 
outsourcing of thinking to theory is about positioning some naive 




observer who would think that theory does its job – do we not ourselves 
necessarily have the illusion that with our little theory we have settled the 
important matters at stake? Google Scholar might be such a naïve 
observer, counting for example our publications and citations, not 
differentiating whether we are being cited positively or negatively (e.g. 
‘De Vos has it completely wrong!’ would still positively augment my 
citation indexes). 
But here we might try to move from our own particular perspective 
– being humanities scholars – to the perspective of the subject as such: 
the so-called layperson, who, one can argue, is itself also a subject of 
theory. That is, if for Jacques Lacan the subject of psychoanalysis is the 
modern subject and he defines the latter as the subject of the sciences,6 
are we not justified in taking this to the letter? For, is it not clear that the 
modern subject no longer understands itself, the others and the world 
from the all-compassing vantage point of an all-seeing and all-
comprehending God (a perspective which the human mortal never can 
share), but, rather, from the more limited position of science and its 
theoretical vantage point? Everything the modern subject does, from 
cooking, eating, sleeping, having sex, raising children, gardening and so 
on, I would claim, is informed by, embedded in, and structured by 
science. More importantly, in all this the layperson is well aware, at least 
in a nut-shell, of the theories involved to makes these things happen: for, 
do we not all know what the academic experts say about how to cook, 
eat, sleep, have sex, raise our children and do the gardening? Our life-
world is no longer the sublunary overviewed by a super-egotic God (all-
seeing and all-knowing our desires and little pleasures), rather, we have 
come to live in an academified habitat realized by the more limited gaze 
of the modern sciences: the naïve observer-gaze renouncing any access 
to the thing as such (the Kantian Ding-an-sich) and limiting itself to 
appearances by dealing with them in a pragmatic and evidence-based 
way.  
Hence, does thus the question become something else: what is 
theory for the modern subject and what is the modern subject for theory? 
It can be expected that that the psy-sciences – in broad terms, the 
sciences dealing with subjectivity itself— play a central role here. The first 




thing then to observe is that the dicta of the psy-sciences effect a 
redoubling: “look, this is what you are” constructs an externalised image 
of yourself, a (neuro)psychological golem or homunculus, for you to look 
upon. What we seem to witness here is the birth of a kind of extra 
persona to which we can outsource our everyday existence within an 
interpassive schema, that is to say, we outsource not what we are, but, 
most importantly, what we are said to be according to science. Consider 
for example how toddlers in so-called Circle Time sessions at school are 
asked how they feel, upon which they are offered four masks portraying 
a happy, sad, angry or scared face. In short: let the mask express the 
appropriate feeling and thus do the feeling.7 In this way the ubiquitous 
brain image seems to be the latest mask which carries our supposed 
main human traits and characteristics. But then again, we should not 
miss here that which we project on the brain is not inasmuch that what 
we are, but, rather, that what we are said to be according to science. In 
other words: the colours of the polychromatic brain scan we all know so 
well stem from the psy-sciences: that is, it is with psychological theories 
that the brain is coloured.8 Hence the brain is but a further step in the 
process of outsourcing: from delegating our being human to our 
redoubled homo psychologicus to further transferring all this to a more 
concrete and allegedly more tangible issue: the brain.  
From here the specific functioning and positing of the issue of 
theory and knowledge for modern subjectivity becomes clearer. We can 
for example, observe that the Circle Time sessions inciting toddlers to 
express their ‘feelings’ are based on a prior theoretical induction of the 
children themselves in the academic theories of emotions. That is, a 
closer inspection on the didactics involved reveal that the children, prior 
to the call to use the masks, get a theoretical class explaining the basic 
scientific insights on human emotions: they are taught the different kinds 
of emotions that allegedly exist and the proper ways to express them. In 
the same way, neuroeducation (the idea to use neuroscientific findings in 
education) cannot but pass over into neuro-education, that is, it cannot 
but pass over educating the pupils themselves into the latest scientific 
discoveries over the brain. For example, an inevitable part of the 
curriculum for 12 to 15 years old is the introduction into the theories of 




the pubescent brain.9 Even the use of cognitive neuroscience in the class 
seems to necessarily involve the induction of the pupils in how the brain 
learns. Is for example in the case of ADHD not the first step in the 
treatment the administration of theory to the parents, teachers and the 
children themselves? For example, the first lesson the “affected” teens 
are hailed with is that ADHD is a brain disorder: 
You may wonder why you have ADHD. (…) Having ADHD is not 
your fault. Research has clearly shown that ADHD runs in families 
(is due to genetics). ADHD is a brain-based disorder, and the 
symptoms shown in ADHD are linked to many specific brain areas. 
There is no known cure for ADHD, but we know many things that 
can reduce the impact that ADHD has on your everyday life.10 
From the ‘we know’ the teens are interpellated to share this knowledge.  
It will be already clear that I am here both leaning on and trying to 
supersede the Althusserian concept of interpellation.11 To begin with, the 
first specificity of the interpellation of the neurospy-sciences is that it 
passes over theory and science: hey you, look, this is the 
(neuro)psychological being that you are according to the latest scientific 
research. Hence, the interpellation is not issued from his master’s voice 
but rather from knowledge, or in Jacques Lacan’s term, from the 
discourse of the university. In this respect, is it not strange that, given the 
time frame, Louis Althusser develops the concept of interpellation from 
the figure of the police officer to account for how ideologies engender its 
subjects? The ‘Hey you’ of the police officer – transforming the person 
who turns around into a subject of law and order – clearly situates the 
issue of ideological interpellation within, in Lacanian terminology, the 
discourse of the master. However, certainly, as Althusser develops his 
concept of interpellation in the heyday of May 68, would it not have made 
more sense to understand ideological interpellation within the discourse 
of the university? For, if we follow Lacan’s interpretation of the shifts in 
power in that period, that timeframe can be understood as the passage 
from the discourse of the master to the discourse of the university as the 
hegemonic discourse in society.12 So, while the classic Althusserian 
schema understands ideological subjectformation in terms of the 
interpellation by the master-signifier, it is precisely the phenomenon of 




(neuro)psychologization which in an exemplary way reveals a different 
kind of interpellation fuelled by the discourse of the university. The further 
specificity of this interpellation is then that it engenders a subject starting 
from the call of 'neutral', objective and impersonal academic knowledge. 
The ‘Hey you’ of the neuropsi-discourses –omnipresent in our society 
from the Kindergarten, school, media, workplace to the retirement 
homes— hails everyone, from the toddler to the elderly, to subjectivize 
oneself starting from the perspective of theory. Here, in contrast to the 
classic Althuserian scheme, you are not called upon to identify as such 
with the object of the call nor are you not called upon to identify in the 
first place with the thing you are said to be (the homo psychologicus or 
the brain). Rather, you are hailed to adopt the position of the neuropsy-
sciences themselves. That is, look, this is the psychological being you 
are/look, this is the brain you are, interpellates us to look at ourselves, the 
others and the world from the neurospi-expert position. We identify 
hence in the first place with the neuropsi-scientist and tell each other: do 
you know that according to brain research… .  
Now, from this reworking of the Althusserian concept of 
interpellation, are we not then driven to question the optimistic undertone 
of Pfaller’s interpassivity? That is, Pfaller writes that interpassivity is a 
strategy of escaping identification and consequently subjectivisation: 
“Interpassivity is therefore either an anti-ideological behaviour, or it is a 
second, and entirely different, type of ideology that does not rest on 
becoming a subject”.13 Let me question this starting from the issue of 
identification itself: does not identification always entail a minimal form of 
non-identification and non-subjectivization making that identification 
always somehow escapes itself? That is, I identify with my father, 
teacher, hero… on the basis of a minimal difference, a minimal other 
place or space from where I look at the image of what I want to be (or at 
the image of what I am said/supposed to be)? Hence, identification and 
subjectivization per definition seems ultimately to rest upon not 
becoming a subject, it relies on a kind of zero-level of subjectivity: one is 
only a subject from a place outside of it, the subject is only a subject 
where the subject escapes itself. This is also operative in a specific way 
in the issue of (neuro)psychologization: one answers the interpellative 




call of the neuropsi-sciences by identifying precisely with the objective 
and eventually empty position of science. One subjectivizes oneself from 
a zero-level of subjectivity one shares with science from where one 
delegates in an interpassive way one’s being to the homunculus 
psychologicus and/or the brain. In this particular case, the self-
forgetfulness (to use Pfaller’s term) involved is far from constituting an 
anti-ideological move as it seems to be firmly held in check by the 
hegemonic discourse of the university. Our not becoming a subject rests 
upon a prior submission to and identification with academia, eventually 
allowing little or no leeway whatsoever. Is this not a case of, to use the 
appropriate Althusserian expression, “ideology at its sharpest”14? At the 
very least, in the case of neuropsychologization the identification of the 
so-called layperson with the academic expert-positon allows the psy-
complex to hold sway over the vast terrains of education, schooling, 
everyday life, work, politics… resulting that both personal and 
interpersonal issues can be controlled and governed in an academic and 
depoliticized way. Just consider how psy-experts now can be find in 
education, matters of law, humanitarian aid …, up and to even in the 
torture chambers.15  
However, maybe we are being a bit too carried away in our 
unleashing of the theory of interpassivity onto the phenomena of 
psychologization and neurologization. For, in his book Interpassivity. The 
Aesthetics of Delegated Enjoyment Pfaller makes a crucial remark on 
interpassive behaviour that we have to take into account: he argues that 
interpassivity allows for a selective contact with a thing in order to 
escape that very thing not only with regard to the enjoyment but also 
with regard to belief (the identification with an illusion).16 Here we can 
return to Pfaller’s interesting idea of the naïve observer: when a person 
delegates for example his or her enjoyment of watching movies to the 
recorder or to the hard disk, he or she does not really think that the 
device is doing the watching: this belief is only ascribed to a naïve 
observer, the person involved does not share it. In the same way, can we 
not say that while we all believe that we are our brain, this believe is only 
held by neuroscience and its naïve gaze? All the while we ourselves hold 
on to the idea that deep down inside us, at the level of our true intentions, 




there is a core that science in the end cannot (or yet cannot) fathom. 
That is, in the same way that magic, as Pfaller explains, relies, in 
principle, on not believing in magic (what Pfallers calls “illusions without 
owners”17), do we not all look upon the findings of the neuropsy-experts 
with a certain scepticism and distance? Consider in this respect what 
philosopher Patricia Churchland argues in an interview when she asks, 
should we think “Gosh, the love that I feel for my child is really just neural 
chemistry?’ Well, actually, yes, it is. But that doesn’t bother me”18. The 
reason it does not bother her is then described by Churchland as follows: 
“Neuroscience doesn’t provide a story about how to live a life”. It is in the 
latter utterance that a certain distance comes in, a certain non-believing, 
a suspicion that ultimately equating the human being with its brain is not 
the end of the story. But of course, here the question changes again: is 
this a distance that challenges reductionism or that simply confirms it? 
That is, are we not simply, but in a very specific and somewhat reversed 
way, back with the post-ideological form of ideology par excellence: “I 
know very well, but nonetheless”19? That is, perhaps we only fully 
subscribe to the dictum ‘we are our brain’ by holding on to the suspicion 
that there is, on a certain level or from a certain perspective, more to us 
than just wetware: nonetheless, we know very well that we are but our 
brain. At the least, this seems to entail that, if magic never had believers –
Pfaller writes “it always happened against better knowledge”20 –  science 
by contrast clearly produces its aficionados and even its zealous radicals, 
i.e. those who marvel to be their brain and who engage on a mission to 
convince the whole world. It is precisely their own non-belief that 
constitutes the very strength of their mission.  
But if at this point, if a theory of interpassivity does not seem to 
allow on the emancipatory potential of the interpellative dynamics of the 
neuropsi-sciences, then perhaps our current changing socio-cultural and 
political-economic predicaments caused by digitalization actually make 
this conundrum obsolete. That is, the discussion whether the spear that 
caused the wound is also the tool to heal it (or, alternatively, whether 
using the tool again in this way only means further poking into the 
wound and aggravating it), might become superfluous as one sees 
oneself confronted in the meantime with other weapons such as fire 




arms.21 Here, is it not clear that the most central way in which today’s 
interpassive subjectivity is mobilised no longer passing in the first 
instance over neuropsychological discourses, but, rather, is something 
which takes place in the terrains of digitality and virtuality, where 
subjectivity is given form without, at least at first sight, the involvement of 
mediating and interpellating discourses. That is, if in interpassivity the 
outsourcing and eventually the ‘not doing’ provides the basis for the 
fulfilment of desire22, is this precisely what cyberspace is all about? We 
are more and more relieved of our duties as increasingly algorithms take 
over and take care of a good deal of our being human: now, instead of 
our homunculus psychologicus or our brain, it is our digital avatar who is 
living our life in our place. And perhaps something changes when 
interpassivity goes digital: that is, if I already questioned the potential 
emancipatory aspect of interpassivity within neuropsychologization, it 
seems that in the digital sphere the chances for preserving leeway even 
grow dimmer. Consider how Pfaller describes interpassivity as 
something opening up a kind of escape route: 
The rituals of interpassivity, its ‘little gestures of disappearance’, 
resemble acts of magic. Just as Haitians liked to spare themselves 
the need to kill their enemies by carefully piercing a doll, hordes of 
interpassivists spare themselves entire evenings in front of the 
television by carefully programming their recording devices.23  
Today, however, hordes of interpassivists do spend entire evenings 
(and days and nights) connected to digital devices in order to spare 
themselves from the task of living. Moreover, is here the digital not 
eventually overruling entirely the ‘little gestures of disappearance’ that 
used to be made possible by the mechanism of interpassivity? For, while 
we outsource our being to our avatar and to the virtual, we ourselves can 
no longer partially retreat or disappear. Not only everything we do in the 
virtual is traced, datafied and profiled, but we are even called upon to 
entrust everything we do in our so-called ‘real life’ to Big Data. All sorts of 
technology (e.g. payment technology, traffic control, camera recognition 
and so on) and our portables and wearables make us increasingly fully 
traceable in time and space. Hence the “little gestures of disappearance” 




make no sense anymore? We are doomed to be present all the time and 
in all kinds of ways.  
Here, the naïve question could be: what will this do with the 
psychology of the human being? How does digital technology affect our 
psychology and/or our brain? However, to immediately counter this it 
should be clear that the theories of the neuropsy-sciences are already in 
play and in place in the way that we are datafied, profiled and traced. As 
Gillespie put it, “information providers rely on neuropsychological 
research in designing the algorithms”.24 Obviously, this compromises 
fundamentally the use of neuropsychology to understand digitalized 
subjectivity: the neuropsychogical theories are precisely underpinning 
the digitalisation of (inter)subjectivity. So instead of taking the path of 
trying to discern the (neuro)psychological effects of digitalization, or, 
more modestly, claiming that Facebook, Google and the like teach us a 
lot on the psychology of the human being, we should ask what 
(neuro)psychological models are precisely stuffed into social media and 
other digital platforms, we should track down the neuropsychological 
theories within the technologies, the algorithms and the codes. Pfaller’s 
theory of interpassivity might be helpful here. 
 
Digitalization and interpassivity 
 
At the last World Economic Forum at Davos George Soros launched an 
attack against Facebook and Google, calling them “a menace to 
society”.25 Soros sees the menace not only on a societal level, that is, as a 
threat to democracy and the integrity of elections, but also on a personal 
level, that is, social media deceive their users by manipulating their 
attention and deliberately engineer addiction to the services they provide. 
This, Soros adds, can be very harmful, particularly for adolescents. In this 
psychologizing understanding of digitalization Soros joined others 
commentators, some of them Silicon Valley entrepreneurs 
themselves.26 Marc Benioff, American internet entrepreneur, author and 
philanthropist (dixit Wikipedia), for example, argued that Facebook 
should be regulated like a cigarette company because of its addictive 




and harmful effects. Roger McNamee, an early investor in Facebook, 
described both it and Google as threats to public health. And even more 
clearly, one of Facebook’s founding chairmen Sean Parker described the 
operational principle of Facebook as to “hack people's psychology to 
hook them”, adding to this the outcry “God only knows what it’s doing to 
our children’s brains”.27 
If these attacks could incite slogans such as save our psychology 
or save our brains from Facebook and the like, the theory of interpassivity 
might help to view this from a different angle. Let me begin by referring to 
Jacques Lacan and more in particular to a passage which is also for 
Pfaller a key to understanding interpassivity. In his seminar The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis Lacan argued the following concerning the function of 
the Chorus in Greek tragedy: 
Your emotions are taken charge of by the healthy order displayed 
on the stage. The Chorus takes care of them. The emotional 
commentary is done for you … Therefore, you don’t have to worry; 
even if you don’t feel anything, the Chorus will feel in your stead. 
Why after all can one not imagine that the effect on you may be 
achieved, at least a small dose of it, even if you didn’t tremble that 
much?28 
The central insight here is that the emotions and the psychology 
only see light in the outsourcing of itself. The human being does not do 
emotions, neither it does the trembling: that is what the Chorus is for. 
Hence, it would be a mistake to consider our psychology as a prior given 
which is then outsourced to or via a device. Our psychology is always 
elsewhere, so the idea that it is under threat of being manipulated or 
even expropriated by technology, as Soros and the other commentators 
have it, misses the logic of interpassivity which is most centrally involved 
here. For Soros and the others there is something beyond and 
also before datafication: that is, some kind of essentialist humanity, 
arguably definable in neuropsychological terms. This is where Soros and 
co-plead for the regulation of social media and internet technologies: to 
reclaim our psychology, to safeguard some kind of a prior agalma of the 
human being. Against this essentially philanthropist29 move to a 
psychoanalytic critique can show, aided by the theory of interpassivity, 




that it is precisely this fantasy, that the human being’s essence can be 
positively defined (in psychological and brain-related terms), that fuels 
datafication and allows for the commodification of subjectivity. To go fast 
here, the issue is not our psychology being hacked by technology, but, 
rather, of us being hooked into a technology via attributing us with a 
psychology. That is, as we are denied our essentially psychology-free 
default position as described by Lacan, we are designated our digital and 
virtual avatars that are attributed with a psychology and with feelings 
which we, as a kind of puppet master, are supposed to set in motion.  
Am I here not sketching (neuro)psychologization 2.0, decisively 
different from the (neuro)psychologization 1.0 described earlier? That is, 
if (neuro)psychologization 1.0 relied on the scientific interpellation, 
involving an identification primordially with the expert position, in 
(neuro)psychologization 2.0, in contrast, interpellation can be simply 
bypassed: we are no longer hailed to look upon ourselves as the homo 
(neuro)psychologicus as this (neuro)psychologization is done, a priori, by 
the digital environment itself and in the design of our avatars. Hence, 
have we not finally outsourced (neuro)psychologization itself to 
technology? Or, to put it in more Foucauldian terms, we no longer have 
to auto-govern ourselves: the governance once outsourced to our 
psychological selves and brains can now be handed over to our avatars 
and smart environments. Is then the end of the subject of ideology, the 
end of interpellation tout-court? Think in this respect of the didactics of 
Circle Time I mentioned earlier in which school children are interpellated 
each morning in a psychologized way: “How Do You Feel Today?” Take a 
look on the “Emotions Chart”!30 It is clear that the presence of the children 
invoked in this way, differs significantly from the taking attendances in 
earlier times where education was above all centred on discipline and 
knowledge: in those times uttering a simple ‘present’ sufficed to answer 
the calling of names. However, when in psychologized times your 
required presence became a psychological one (as you had to report 
your psycho-emotional state within the required format), in digital times 
an interpellative call is even no longer necessary. Not only your presence 
and your whereabouts can be electronically verified (some schools 
already use tracking technology and ditto devices, so taking attendances 




is no longer necessary), but even “real-time mood-tracking devices” 
(smart cameras allegedly able to detect human emotions) can be used 
to assess your emotional state so as to adapt your learning content for 
that day (or perhaps arrange a meeting with the school psychologist).31 At 
the least, while the psychologized and neurologized subject was 
interpellated via inducing it into academic theories, the digitalized subject 
is not necessarily called upon to share the theoretical outlook. That is, as 
the prospect of using these “real-time mood-tracking devices” shows, 
data gathering and handling can function perfectly without a knowing 
subject. Social media prompt us to like this, to be sorry for that, to buy 
this… without us having to know the coded rationale behind all that. 
Hence, in contrast to the psychologist and the neuroscientist, Big Data 
does not care whether one knows or not: we do not need to be educated 
in theories about what is driving us: data-technology and algorithms 
work silently in the background simply drive, guide and steer our 
behaviour. It suffices to prescript our avatars and preconfigure our digital 
environments with the help of psychological models. 
Does this not mean that interpassivity is mobilised within 
digitalization in a totally different way than before the essentialisation of 
technology? To answer this, let us first return to how interpassivity 
functioned within (neuro)psychologization 1.0. While 
(neuro)psychologization 1.0 called into being an interpassive 
psychologised subject (letting the redoubled homo [neuro]psychologicus 
doing the being), one could argue that, on the other hand, 
(neuro)psychologization was always already a denouncing of 
interpassivity itself, perhaps first and foremost of older forms of 
interpassivity. Think in this respect of Slavoj Žižek’s example of the hired 
mourners which in certain societies are engaged to do the mourning and 
grieving at the funeral: they allow the relatives of the deceased to be at 
ease and to bother not if they actually do not feel that much so that they 
can deal with more mundane matters such as the dividing of the 
heritage.32 Are it not these kinds of interpassive outsourcing of emotions 
which are under attack in the era of psychologization? That is, in 
psychologized times we are precisely called upon to express our 
feelings, we are not allowed to deny them, we are urged to let them flow 




and deal with them (in the appropriate way of course). One could 
compare this with the reformationist religious movements mentioned by 
Pfaller as these denounce the supposedly empty rituals of traditional 
religious practices.33 Reformationists thus oppose the interpassive modus 
of believing (the outsourcing of believing via for example monotonous 
praying or other rituals actions or artefacts) and urge the believer to do 
the believing for him or herself. Is in the same way the psychological 
interpellation not interpellating us in the first place to fall together with our 
emotions, to not deny them or outsource them? Of course, the paradox is 
that this only leads to a secondary interpassivity, where the emotions are 
eventually located with the homo [neuro]psychologicus we are said to 
be. Precisely this primary call to vouch for our psychological states, is 
easily traceable with social media such as Facebook, urging us to 
express our emotions and to share them with our friends. But there too 
one can eventually discern the validity of Pfallers contention that the 
leaps of reform in religion do not succeed in dispelling interpassivity but 
only render the interpassive dimension of religion more and more 
invisible.34 That is, in the social media’s call to coincide with our feelings 
only new and more hidden forms of interpassivity are prepared. Think 
how for a lot of people Facebook is something which one opens once a 
day (as if it were a ritual) in order to disperse some likes, share a post or 
two, report this or that and then to log off and return to the daily 
businesses. Hence, there is no subject involved: one simply lets his or her 
avatar lead its little life along the pre-configured paths.  
Is the conclusion here that digitalisation after all brings not that 
much new, as it still allows for a non-engaged, non subjectivized subject 
(if I am allowed to put it this way)? So, the task of critical theory would 
still be to render the invisible visible, that is, to show what is hidden in 
plain sight: the interpassive character of digitalized subjecitivity. However, 
and here I am compelled to make a decisive turn in my argument: 
perhaps the heightened invisibility of interpassivity 2.0 does signify a new 
turn in the realm of subject formations, due to its enhanced capability to 
pre-structure our environment and life world (pre-psychologizing our 
avatars and social interactions) and its bypassing of the classic 
academic interpellation). That is, besides the already hinted-at capability 




of digitalisation to our presence in so-called ‘real life’ into its reach 
(making us fully traceable in time and space), perhaps the more decisive 
issue is that it is able to even pull our very absence into its economy. For, 
if in the understanding of Pfaller interpassivity entailed little pockets of 
non-subjectivation and allowed for a minimal leeway, is digitalization not 
able, for the first time, to truly control and thus exploit this very aspect 
of not being there itself? So perhaps, instead of merely arguing that in 
interpassivity 2.0 one cannot anymore disappear or leave the scene, it 
would be more concise to contend that it is precisely this very non-
presence which is fed back into the system itself. Put differently, if the 
interpassivity of the religious ritual made possible that the religious 
subject can go away,35 the digitalized subject’s going away is contained 
by the web and the internet itself. Ultimately, not being on Facebook 
actually necessitates one to have a Facebook account.  
Perhaps this allows to understand the recent changed policies of 
Facebook: this is what Mark Zuckerberg announced:  
The research shows that when we use social media to connect 
with people we care about, it can be good for our well-being. We 
can feel more connected and less lonely, and that correlates with 
long term measures of happiness and health. On the other hand, 
passively reading articles or watching videos  –  even if they're 
entertaining or informative -- may not be as good.36 
Zuckerberg seemingly wants to activate us into mere passive 
enjoyment or an intake of knowledge? Not good! We have to engage 
with others, apparently for our own psychological well-being. However, 
again, we should read through this psychologizing and objectifying 
philanthropist move and discern how Zuckerberg is trying to secure his 
business model. Is in the first place his attack on passivity not also an 
attack on interpassivity? What Zuckerberg wants to counter is that the 
subject recedes and then takes leave by letting your account and your 
algorithms cater you with news, movies and video’s and enjoying all this 
in your place? This is not good for Zuckerberg! Not good perhaps for the 
simple reason that merely interpassive behaviour which allows the 
subject to disappear does not provide Facebook with much useful data 




to be commodified. Hence, wanting to address this, Zuckerberg, in all his 
sovereignty, makes it clear: 
Based on this, we're making a major change to how we build 
Facebook. I'm changing the goal I give our product teams from 
focusing on helping you find relevant content to helping you have 
more meaningful social interactions.37 
Hence, the business model of Facebook is not about delivering 
content to be consumed interpassively, but to incite you by way of your 
Facebook avatar to produce “more meaningful social interactions”. Does 
this not show that, concerning the digitalization of subjectivity, there is 
still a minimal interpellation involved? That is, you are continually called 
back to Facebook, your interpassive going away and you’re not having 
“meaningful social interactions” must be countered by Facebook in order 
to lead you back to the system. However, does this not mean in the end 
that digitality as such does allow for little absences, little moments of 
non-subjectivity which social media corporations then try to neutralise 
and bring back into their economy? But, perhaps we are missing 
something here: are we not too rapidly assuming that it is the 
“meaningful social interactions” which are datafied and commodified by 
social media businesses? For if it is the case, as I have argued, that 
social media and the like are a priori stuffed with socio-psychological 
models, then, for sure, the mere reproduction of that psychology by the 
users cannot really produce something new and engender a surplus 
value. So, the issue of leading the vanishing and wandering subject back 
to the platform in order to produce the psycho-social data might be not 
really the issue at stake. Perhaps, Pfaller’s elaboration on a redoubled 
pleasure in interpassivity might help us to see thing still in other way:  
The mischievous pleasure, which appears in some cases of 
interpassivity, such as that described by Žižek, seems to rest on the 
dual character of this withdrawal: having escaped both enjoying 
and the illusion of enjoyment, and having delegated both to 
someone else, seems to be enormous fun. First, one withdraws 
from the enjoyment, then from the illusion of it – and apparently 
that produces new, even greater enjoyment.38 




Thus, on social media and similar platforms, I myself do not have 
to perform the required standard socio-psychological role: my avatar 
does all the prescribed enjoying of life and the enjoying of social 
interactions. Hence, as a result, the extra pleasure: the surplus enjoyment 
realized is the pleasure of being no-body. Is it not precisely this fun, the 
fun of having left the building, that is cashed in by digital capitalism of 
which Facebook is a prime example? Digital capitalism does not feed on 
our outsourced ‘fake subjectivities’; it does not feed on the pre-coded and 
the preconfigured psychology which can be endlessly digitally 
reproduced, rather, it is the surplus enjoyment of our interpassive 
outsourcing that digital exploitation eventually extracts from us.  
To illustrate is let me cite here the transcript of a famous 
PlayStation TV Commercial: 'Double Life' (1999): 
For years, I’ve lived a double life. In the day, I do my job—I ride the 
bus, roll up my sleeves with the hoi-polloi … but at night, I live a life 
of exhilaration … of missed heartbeats and adrenalin … and, if the 
truth be known … a life of dubious virtue. … I won’t deny I’ve been 
engaged in violence, even indulged in it. … I’ve maimed and killed 
adversaries, and not merely in self-defense. … I’ve exhibited 
disregard for life … limb … and property … and savored every 
moment. … You may not think it, to look of me … but I have 
commanded armies … and conquered worlds. … And though, in 
achieving these things … I’ve set morality aside … I have no regrets. 
… For though I’ve led a double life, at least I can say … I have lived.39 
Hence, the minimal interpellation involved in the digitalization of 
subjectivity, might be understood in yet another way: you are called to 
fake and to feign (to have a double life) because you joyously know what 
the human being really wants, desires or craves.40 The PlayStation 
commercial thus does not show the exploitation of our true 
psychological, neurobiological make-up (e.g. our innate and evolutionary 
determined thirst for murder and transgression), but rather, it cashes in 
the self-evident of our theoretical beliefs of what it is to be human. So, 
what I have called the classic academic interpellation in which the 
subject is called upon to identify with the expert position to look at 
the homo neuropsychologicus he or she is said to be, is precisely what is 




put to work in digitality. That is, the identification with the academic gaze 
(the identification with the non-subjective objective point of view) is in a 
second movement fed into the system itself. The enjoyment exploited by 
PlayStation, and in digitality as such, is not primitive, transgressive 
enjoyment, it is the “even greater enjoyment” that sees light when the 
human being takes a step back and interpassively engage in its little 
gestures of disappearance. 
Conclusion 
 
Ray Kurzweil, American author, computer scientist, inventor and futurist 
(according to Wikipedia), argued that it will soon be possible to upload 
the brain to a supercomputer.41 Of course, it is clear that, if one were in 
fact able to successfully upload a person or a subject, this uploaded 
entity would be doomed from the very start. That is to say, connected to 
the internet, the brain would become megalomaniacal and absorb all 
available knowledge: it would expand in uncontrollable ways, infinitely 
metamorphosise, become all the things in the world, if not, for that 
matter, become the world itself and thus dissolve as such. Perhaps we 
can understand this within the theory of interpassivity: in the same way 
as in religious rituals the religious subject can go away, here, once the 
uploading/outsourcing is done, the initiator can leave the scene and it is 
precisely this I would argue, would lead the uploaded personality to 
wither away in informational entropy.42 
One could connect this to another thought well-known experiment, 
that is, the movie series The Matrix. The baseline of the story is that as 
machines and technology have become autonomous they tap electricity 
and energy from the human beings for their survival. The humans are 
held prisoners in a kind of embryonic water-filled cradles and are 
connected to a supercomputer which generates a virtual reality, this is 
the Matrix, meant to keep the humans alive so  that energy can 
harvested from them. This is how one of the machines relates the history 
of the Matrix: 
Did you know that the first Matrix was designed to be a perfect 
human world where none suffered, where everyone would be 




happy? It was a disaster. No one would accept the program. Entire 
crops were lost. Some believed that we lacked the programming 
language to describe your "perfect world". But I believe that, as a 
species human beings define their reality through misery and 
suffering. So the perfect world was a dream that your primitive 
cerebrum kept trying to wake up from.  – Agent Smith to 
Morpheus43 
Can we not say that the first Matrix established a fully scripted 
scene informed by the mainstream (socio)psychological theories? Along 
these lines, one could argue that it was in the first place the avatars 
withered away –in the same way that Kurzweil’s uploaded personalities 
would come to a halt— as the virtual world came to a stand-still as a 
result of the endless circular repetition and reproduction of the 
established socio-psychological codes and algorithms. Hence, what 
becomes clear in both The Matrix and the fantasy of Kurzweil –and also 
in the latest move of Mark Zuckerberg as described above – is that 
digitality needs to involve a minimal form of interpassivity, and as already 
mentioned, a minimal form of interpellation establishing a zero-level of 
subjectivity; something on the outside, to be then drawn in. Only then a 
surplus enjoyment can be created which not only secures the further 
digital flow but can also be harvested. This is why the Matrix needs its 
renegades, its awakeners, its Morpheus, its Neo, its Oracle. Those who 
allegedly escape are eventually the backbone of the second Matrix, they 
make the Matrix function. The outside drawn in, or what Lacan calls, 
“extimity”44, is what stalls informational entropy. Now here we need to ask 
the final and crucial question: could this function, would digitality really 
be able to fully draw interpassivity into its jurisdiction? That is, would it be 
possible to algorithmically stage and code the very interpassive and 
subjectless subject? This, I claim, is eventually the same question Pfaller 
poses:  
Can my representing agent also let him or herself be represented 
by someone (or something) else? And for whom does that new 
agent then experience the pleasure – for the other agent or for 
me?45 




Thus, is this not the question: is interpassive delegation possible ad 
infinitum? And further: can it be thus redoubled endlessly within itself? 
And, from here, could this perpetuum mobile be held in check, contained 
symbolically, or, in terms more appropriate for our discussion, could it be 
digitalized and thus commodofied? Of course, here we are slowly 
moving to the question, would the sophisticated Pfallerian and 
psychoanalytic conception of the human being as interpassive be 
codable and algoritmitizable? Or, differently still: would it be possible to 
base the second Matrix on a psychoanalytic conception of the subject 
instead of the mainstream psychological model it was first informed by?  
Clearly, psychoanalysis is not a psychology. Lacan, as well know, 
refrained from a psychological approach of subjectivity, he for example 
did not define the subject as such, but opted for defining the contours of 
the subject. He thus argued that “the signifier is that what represents the 
subject for another signifier”46. This is Lacan’s matheme: S1 - $ - S2. The 
subject is but a position: divided over two signifiers, it is itself but a zero-
level of subjectivity. Now consider in this with respect to the software-
developer Dave Winer’s contention: “Connect persons to data objects to 
persons. That’s the social today.”47 Which could be written as: person(s) – 
code – person(s). Is this not precisely the opposite of the notation of the 
Lacanian subject as a divided subject? In the person-code-person series, 
the person is no longer split; he or she is pinned down, he or she is 
datafied. Or, as Alexander Galloway puts it regarding cybernetics: 
“cybernetics refashions the world as a system and refashions the subject 
as an agent”.48 Hence, the interpellation of Winer’s ‘connection’ does not 
envision to give rise to a subject, but, rather, incites agents to produce 
data. But although this datafication seems to prepare the 
commodification of subjectivity, is this not, as argued, the situation which 
eventually will come to a halt, as it fails to engage the zero-level of 
subjectivity which is arguably the motor of surplus-subjectivity? That is, 
the data one produces upon the digital interpellation cannot but repeat 
the preconfigured data stemming from the models of the human being 
that were coded into the system. This repetition of sterile data, arguably, 
cannot but lead the system to a staggering halt. Here we return to a 
daring question: would it be possible to code the second Matrix starting 




from the non-psychology of psychoanalysis and avoid the databubble 
from bursting as it would inevitably succumb under its own weight? 
Bring in the psychoanalysts to guard us against informational entropy 
(and save the business model of social media)?  
But perhaps, in the same way that according to Pfaller, theory 
cannot tell art what to think –it can only tell art what it does not need to 
think49 –  a psychoanalytic critique also cannot tell how avatars how their 
environments should be designed. If psychoanalysis is basically a 
critique on psychology (see Lacan’s awry definition of subjectivity above), 
it cannot cater for a new, alternative psychology. Consequently, if for 
example the problem with the neurosciences is that they cannot but rely 
on a prior psychology (which they try to trace in the brain), 
psychoanalysis cannot cater for an alternative psychology to be used: 
psychoanalysis can only tell neuroscience what it does not need in order 
to think. So, when it comes to designing digitality, again psychoanalysis 
cannot tell how to design the digital subject or its lifeworld: it can only 
deliver a critique, it can only tell what does not need to be thought, it can 
only lay bare the problematic psychological models underpinning the 
design of digital technologies.  
 Of course, this is troublesome. Think of Dutch media philosopher 
Geert Lovink as well as the reformationist critiques of George Soros and 
co, who at a given point argues for the nationalisation of Facebook.50 But 
does this not beg the question, how would these public, non-commercial 
social media be designed? For example, would it retain emoticons? 
Would it still prompt users to express their feelings? Would it ask for 
‘likes’? Would it remind you to post something, or remind you of 
interesting stories you missed when you were offline for a while? 
Moreover, what algorithms would be used to put news or posts in your 
feed? In short, besides which images of society and of the human being 
would be in vigor? So how would the designers proceed after being 
briefed by psychoanalysis on what it does not need to think? Would an 
option be to try to create minimalized neutral spaces, for example, to 
ensure democracy and individuality? Of course, there one would be 
rapidly engaging the common image of the human being and its human 
rights, and as well known, this does not lead us to uncontested grounds. 




Hence the exclamation “another world is possible” today seems to be 
confronted with the riddle, “would another digitality be possible?”, one 
that would be able to account for both that “society does not exist” and 
“subjectivity does not exist”?  
 At the very least, if this entails that a neutral position is not possible, 
and thus a partisan and political stance cannot be avoided, then from the 
side of psychoanalysis the bottom line should be that “subjectivity will not 
be digitalized”. Even though there is this other Lacanian notation 
concerning the subject, namely that of the fantasy, which at first sight 
would give software developers hope. Lacan’s matheme of the fantasy 
situates the split subject vis-à-vis the objet a: $ ◊ a. This is of course 
connected to the previous mentioned notation of subjectivity as it brings 
in the object a as both cause and object of desire. As Lacan understands 
the fantasy in the Freudian tradition as a little scenario underpinning 
once symptomatology and hence one’s subjectivity (as a rule in the form 
of a little sentence, e.g. Freud’s “a child has been beaten”51), it is hard not 
to understand it as an algorithm.52 However, the crucial element in the 
matheme is the object a, which I would argue, as cause and object of 
desire, is in the end a non-assimilable object: it is not just merely an 
unknown x that could be fed into computation. It is, rather, a singular 
object, which, although Lacan has assigned it “the status of an algebraic 
sign”,53 is not merely a formal factor as it is defined as the remnant left 
behind by the introduction of the Symbolic in the Real. Hence, situated at 
the side of the Real one could attribute the objet a a materiality, albeit 
a peculiar materiality.54 As signalling the void, objet a has itself no  
substantial consistence, however, as object and cause of desire it 
remains on the side of the analogue, not to be digitalized or 
virtualized. Object a hence cannot be fed back into the system: objet a 
will not be digitalized. Today’s digitality pretends to be able to do this, it 
dreams of that, and we know how powerful in this day and age illusions 
are when they go virtual. It is the partisan task of critique to say that 
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